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Can Strikes Pay for Management?
Pro Sports’ Major Turnarounds
EDWARD GEORGE FISHER1*
Collective bargaining and antitrust law emancipated players. 
The advent of free agency and related contractual provisions 
created a battle line over splitting revenues. Work stoppages 
can foster players’ resisting or employers’ enforcing “salary 
restraint mechanisms.” Each major sport had a major showdown 
and corresponding turnaround in “survival bargaining.” My 
framework adds “litigious and other maneuvers” as backups to the 
traditional strategic choices of “reconfiguring” versus “forcing” 
or “resisting change.” It expands on Walton and McKersie’s 
“sanction as an investment device,” “intra-organizational 
bargaining,” and “attitudinal structuring” (1965). In each major 
turnaround management eventually achieved a stable contractual 
formula consistent with a three-pronged formula: (1) demonstrate 
a performance gap, (2) play on worst fears via sanctions or their 
threat, and (3) provide incentives to settle or change.
Collective bargaining and antitrust law helped emancipate players from 
quasi indentured servitude. Free agency enabled players  periodically to 
negotiate individually via agents with other clubs. It combined with other 
provisions (e.g., individual salary disclosure and arbitration) and certain 
owners’ competitive urges to foster player salary escalation. Revenue growth 
and the occasional emergence of rival leagues also fuelled such  salary 
 spirals. In response, owners tried to limit players’ salaries  contractually via 
collectively bargained salary restraint mechanisms. Owners  occasionally 
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became involved in survival bargaining to effect a major turnaround (i.e., 
significantly restructure the contractual formula so both sides could survive, 
if not prosper).
Potentially yielding major confrontations, work stoppages (or their 
threat) permit two key strategic choices. Both sides try to either “force” their 
vision of the future and corresponding terms on the other or “foster” change 
by embracing the change proponent’s initiative to restructure the contractual 
formula to fit the current market signals or structure. The politics of intra-
organizational bargaining typically eliminate fostering from the outset of 
negotiations. A sanction may induce fostering later on. Each side’s view 
or strategic choice clearly corresponds to a bargaining agenda or mandate: 
a contractual formula (Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld and McKersie, 1994). 
These typically reflect the desires or especially needs of the various fac-
tions in each side’s set of principals. The latter possess the power of the 
vote in two crucial strategic decisions to (1) invoke a sanction or (2) ratify 
a memorandum of settlement.
Using high rates of discount, Eaton empirically showed that on average 
strikes pay for workers (1972). As many employers carefully guard profit 
statements, it is very difficult empirically to measure if work stoppages or 
other sanctions (e.g., interest arbitration, adjudication, or civil suits) pay 
for management. Management’s view of a contractual formula promoting 
proper realignment represents a benchmark for evaluating bargaining results 
in survival bargaining.
To gauge the comparative success of a sanction in inducing  concessions 
from the other side, each case studied involves executive summaries 
of  bargaining rounds from the literature and Internet. Such qualitative 
 information should suffice to study what my framework focuses on: (1) 
strategic options pursued, (2) corresponding strategic negotiation processes 
used, and (3) basic results achieved relative to management’s change initia-
tive. A key objective during a work stoppage clearly is to maintain unity to 
outlast the other. Basic units of analysis are the bargaining units and agents 
that are parties to collective bargaining agreements (Yin, 1984). To build 
theory, I extract refutable propositions related to my conceptual framework 
that encapsulate key lessons from pro sports’ four major showdowns and 
turnarounds. Concluding comments follow that qualitative data analysis.
STRATEGIC CHOICE/NEGOTIATION AND SANCTIONS AS 
INVESTMENTS
The traditional strategic choice model of industrial relations unfolds 
at three levels: strategic, functional, and operational. Strategic choices 
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are made in the corporate and union executive boardrooms. Professional 
negotiators and human resource managers seek to implement the  ensuing 
business plan, including the underlying principled justifications or busi-
ness case. The resulting collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and 
human resource plan, as implemented, become a part of the “web of rules” 
 governing the shop floor activities. Occasionally, local deal-making, often 
involving pressure tactics like mid-contract strikes or their threat,  modifies 
the CBA’s provisions’ intentions. This entire process yields a series of 
policies, procedures, protocols, and practices (Fisher and Kondra, 1993; 
Kochan and Katz, 1988).
Changing mindsets, especially the other’s, is a core activity of all 
 negotiations. Strategic negotiation specifically involves: (1) carefully 
 diagnosing the situation, (2) making strategic choices to best solve the 
problems faced, (3) especially how to structure the negotiating process 
to produce the desired resolution to those problems, and (4) avoiding 
 negotiation failure: namely falling short of the objectives considered to be 
necessary or feasible under the circumstances (e.g., Lewicki, Hiam and Wise 
Olander, 1996; Walton and McKersie, 1965; Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld 
and McKersie, 1994).
Strategic Choice
A situational analysis revealing a major problem or performance 
gap typically yields a change initiative to significantly restructur-
ing the  contractual formula so both sides can survive or prosper in
future (Chaykowski and Verma, 1992). To “get competitive now,” 
 management’s initial strategizing normally will have eliminated two options 
or scenarios: (1) “going out of business now” by maintaining the status quo, 
and (2) “going down slow.” Gradual demise envisages signing a CBA that 
is inferior to management’s vision of the future or desired reconfiguration
but superior to the status quo which the union customarily seeks when 
resisting change. The union’s resistance platform normally derives from 
dissension among the ranks, colliding bargaining agendas among various 
factions, or a desire to appear to be hard negotiators (Fisher and Kushner, 
1986).
Figure 1 depicts the carrot and stick strategic choice options available 
in (survival) bargaining. The former, Option X, is to foster change via inter-
est-based negotiations and achieve a restructuring. The latter, Option Y, is 
to force change via mutual hardball or a work stoppage in a power struggle 
where each tries to force its terms on the other. The upwards arrows from 
the downwards spiral of Option Y to Option X represent managerial success 
in gaining some degree of restructuring.
1- Fisher-pages3a.indd   5 2007-04-02   16:40:47
6 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2007, VOL. 62, No 1
FI
G
U
RE
 1
St
ra
te
gi
c 
C
ho
ic
e 
in
 C
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
Ba
rg
ai
ni
ng
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TR
AN
SI
TI
O
N 
PO
IN
T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ST
RA
TE
G
IC
 C
H
O
IC
E 
O
PT
IO
NS
: 
 
FI
R
M
’S
 P
ER
FO
RM
A
N
CE
 O
R 
ST
RU
CT
U
RE
 
 
 
 
FO
ST
ER
CH
AN
G
E 
= 
O
PT
IO
N 
X 
W
or
kfo
rce
 Re
st
ru
ct
ur
in
g
A
PP
EA
R 
N
O
T 
TO
 M
A
TC
H
 N
EW
 C
O
N
TE
X
T
TO
 R
EC
O
N
FI
G
U
RE
  
 
W
or
k R
ul
e 
Am
el
io
ra
tio
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(P
rod
uc
tiv
ity
 B
arg
ain
ing
)   
    
    
Co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
Re
str
uc
tu
rin
g
 
 
 
[In
te
re
st
-B
a
se
d]
 
 
 
Su
bs
tit
ut
e C
a
pi
ta
l fo
r L
ab
or
 
CO
NT
EX
TU
AL
 
PE
ND
IN
G
 O
R 
AC
TU
AL
   
  L
IT
IG
IO
U
S 
O
R 
O
TH
ER
 M
AN
EU
VE
RS
 =
 O
PT
IO
N 
Z
Pr
oc
es
s I
nt
er
ve
nt
io
n 
or
 
CH
AN
G
E
PE
RF
O
RM
AN
CE
 G
AP
 
 
 
 
TO
 F
O
RC
E 
RE
CO
N
FI
G
U
RA
TI
O
N
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ci
rc
um
ve
nt
io
n,
 In
cl
ud
in
g
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
R 
M
A
IN
TA
IN
 S
TA
TU
S 
QU
O 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ri
gh
ts-
Ba
se
d 
Fe
ed
ba
ck
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[R
ig
ht
s-
Ba
se
d]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(A
dju
dic
ati
ve
 Sa
nc
tio
ns)
 
 
 
 
 
M
AN
AG
EM
EN
T’
S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
D
et
er
io
ra
tio
n 
 
 
 
 
CA
RR
O
T 
AN
D
 S
TI
CK
 A
PP
RO
AC
H
   
 
FO
RC
E 
O
W
N 
TE
RM
S 
= 
O
PT
IO
N 
Y 
A 
D
iffe
ren
t U
nio
n 
(H
yb
rid
 St
ra
te
gy
: 
 
(C
oll
idi
ng
 A
ge
nd
as,
 Sa
nc
tio
n  
    
    
Do
wn
wa
rd 
Sp
ira
l) 
No
nu
ni
on
 C
on
ve
rs
io
n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ch
oi
ce
 X
 v
er
su
s C
ho
ic
e 
Y
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[P
ow
er
-B
as
ed
] 
 
 
Ru
in
at
io
n 
(=
De
mi
se 
of 
Al
l) 
1- Fisher-pages3a.indd   6 2007-04-02   16:40:47
7CAN STRIKES PAY FOR MANAGEMENT?
Le
ge
nd
:
Ch
oi
ce
 X
  
M
an
ag
em
en
t’s
 v
isi
on
 o
f f
ut
ur
e,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
a 
ne
w
 fo
rm
ul
a 
fo
r t
he
 c
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ba
rg
ai
ni
ng
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t
Ch
oi
ce
 Y
 
Fo
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t: 
u
se
 o
f s
an
ct
io
n 
to
 a
tte
m
pt
 to
 fo
rc
e 
Ch
oi
ce
 X
; fo
r u
nio
n: 
ac
tiv
el
y 
re
sis
t m
an
ag
er
ia
l c
ha
ng
e 
in
iti
at
iv
es
 v
ia
 p
ow
er
 
ba
rg
ai
ni
ng
 a
nd
, i
f n
ec
es
sa
ry
, a
 sa
nc
tio
n 
to
 tr
y 
to
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
th
e 
sta
tu
s q
uo
Ch
oi
ce
 Z
 
U
se
 p
ro
ce
ss
 in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
to
 c
ha
ng
e 
ne
go
tia
tio
ns
’ d
yn
am
ic
s 
or
 c
irc
um
ve
nt
io
n 
lik
e 
ad
jud
ica
tiv
e s
an
cti
on
s (
e.g
., a
rbi
tra
tio
n) 
to 
try
 to
 
im
po
se
 m
an
ag
em
en
t’s
 v
ie
w
 (C
ho
ice
 X
) o
r t
he
 un
ion
’s 
(of
ten
 th
e s
tat
us
 qu
o)
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 B
ar
ga
in
in
g 
Ty
pi
ca
lly
 in
vo
lv
es
 re
la
xi
ng
 w
or
k 
ru
le
s a
nd
 re
str
uc
tu
rin
g 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
in
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
fo
r jo
b r
ete
nti
on
Pr
oc
es
s 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n 
In
cl
ud
es
 e
xt
er
na
lly
: m
ed
ia
tio
n,
 “
jaw
-bo
nin
g”
 by
 pu
bli
c o
ffi
cia
ls,
 ad
vis
ory
 (n
on
-bi
nd
ing
) a
rbi
tra
tio
n, 
an
d b
ac
k 
to
 w
or
k 
le
gi
sla
tio
n;
 
in
cl
ud
es
 in
te
rn
al
ly
: a
 n
ew
 n
eg
ot
ia
to
r, 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ss
io
n 
of
 c
hi
ef
 n
eg
ot
ia
to
rs
, o
r 
se
co
nd
 r
oo
m
 f
or
 jo
int
 br
ain
sto
rm
ing
 to
 al
ter
 th
e 
n
eg
ot
ia
tio
ns
’ d
yn
am
ic
s
Pr
oc
es
s 
Ci
rc
um
ve
nt
io
n 
In
cl
ud
es
 (l
eg
isl
ati
ve
) e
nd
 ru
ns
 to
 hi
gh
er 
au
tho
rit
ies
 to
 ch
an
ge
 ri
gh
ts,
 ex
ter
na
lly
 im
po
sed
 in
ter
est
 ar
bit
ra
tio
n,
 o
r i
lle
ga
l s
tri
ke
s t
o 
ga
in
 
w
ha
t c
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
ga
in
ed
 v
ia
 a
rb
itr
at
io
n
A
dju
dic
ati
ve
 Sa
nc
tio
ns 
 
In
cl
ud
e 
gr
ie
va
nc
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n,
 ri
gh
ts 
ar
bi
tra
tio
n,
 la
bo
r r
el
at
io
ns
 b
oa
rd
 re
vi
ew
, a
nd
 b
an
kr
up
tc
y 
co
ur
t
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
D
et
er
io
ra
tio
n 
O
fte
n 
re
fle
ct
ed
 in
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
di
sc
ip
lin
ar
y 
ac
tio
ns
 b
y 
m
an
ag
em
en
t (
ch
all
en
ge
s) 
an
d 
liti
gio
us
 re
sis
tan
ce
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
un
io
n 
gr
ie
va
nc
e 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 fl
oo
di
ng
 o
r m
id
-c
on
tra
ct
 st
rik
es
 (r
esp
on
ses
)
So
ur
ce
s: 
Ch
ay
ko
w
sk
i a
nd
 V
er
m
a 
(19
92
); 
Fis
he
r a
nd
 K
on
dra
 (1
99
3);
 Fi
sh
er 
an
d K
us
hn
er 
(19
86
); 
Fis
he
r a
nd
 M
arc
ian
o (
19
95
); 
Ko
ch
an
 an
d 
K
at
z 
(19
88
); 
Sm
ith
 
(19
71
); 
Ur
y, 
Br
ett
 an
d G
old
en
be
rg 
(19
88
); 
W
alt
on
 an
d M
cK
ers
ie 
(19
65
); 
W
alt
on
, C
utc
he
r-G
ers
he
nfe
ld 
an
d M
cK
ers
ie 
(19
94
). 
1- Fisher-pages3a.indd   7 2007-04-02   16:40:47
8 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2007, VOL. 62, No 1
The upwards arrow from Option Y to Option Z’s litigious and other 
maneuvers embodies and reflects the wide range of strategic dispute reso-
lution tools customarily available to negotiators. They serve as regulating 
mechanisms to redirect negotiations, often more constructively, or impose 
rights-based decisions to clarify the parties’ interests or power (Ury, Brett 
and Goldenberg, 1988). Explicitly incorporating Option Z as a key strategic 
choice to manage strategic negotiation appears to make an original contri-
bution (e.g., Chaykowski and Verma, 1992; Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld 
and McKersie, 1994).
Forcing versus Fostering
Figure 2 stems from research on Canada’s airlines’ labour relations in 
the early 1990s. It uses two key factors to classify relationships by  proclivity 
to force versus foster and commitment to uphold an ensuing deal. They are 
the nature of the parties’ working relationship and their degree of interde-
pendence. A proxy variable for the former is the parties’ degree of respect, 
trust, and commitment to uphold a deal. The greater the interdependence 
or the better the working relationship, the lower tends to be the proclivity 
to resort to forcing and the higher the commitment to uphold a deal, all 
else the same.
Each major group generally fits into each quadrant. Pilots and 
 mechanics are needed to fly planes; ticket agents and flight attendants are 
much more easily replaced. Pilots’ seniority-based pay system means they 
have the most to lose and, therefore, a very high commitment to organi-
zational  survival. They interact with and think much like management. 
These factors generally facilitate fostering. Having greater mobility and a 
relatively even match of skilled and unskilled workers, mechanics pursue 
traditional job control unionism. Their high degree of interdependence, 
however, tends to mitigate all-out forcing. Though vulnerable to replace-
ment during a strike, passenger agents had an honest, straightforward union 
leader and leveraged the resulting goodwill in limited fostering. In contrast, 
flight attendants exhibited a low commitment to uphold deals, reflecting a 
generally poor working relationship. They experienced managerial forcing 
during  concession bargaining of the 1980s (Fisher and Kondra, 1992).
The Three-Pronged Formula to Change Mindsets
The power to reward or punish plays a key role in changing mindsets. In 
sanction as an investment device (SAID) terminology, bargaining normally 
ends by settling without a sanction—Plan A—and infrequently by settling 
during a sanction—Plan B (Figure 3). At the table the SAID carrot and stick 
counterpart to Option X versus Y as strategic choices is Plan A versus B.
1- Fisher-pages3a.indd   8 2007-04-02   16:40:47
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FIGURE 2
Two Key Correlates of a Fostering versus Forcing Bargaining Style and 
Commitment to Uphold Ensuing Agreements: Based on Canadian Airlines’ 
Labour Relations in the Early 1990s
Good
Nature of 
Working 
Relationship
Poor
Limited Fostering
(Committed to Deal)
[Ticket Agents]
Fostering (Interest-Based) Orientation
(Highly Committed to Deal)
[Pilots]
Forcing via Power Bargaining
(Low Commitment to Uphold Deal)
[Flight Attendants]
Restrained Forcing via Power 
Negotiating
(General Commitment to Uphold Deal)
[Machinists]
Low Degree of Interdependence High
Legend:
[  ] Major airlines’ group
Fostering Orientation Primarily interest-based bargaining or productivity bargaining (Figure 1)
Restrained Forcing Primarily power negotiations, involving positional bargaining, with certain 
major compromises tending to create second-best resolutions
Power Negotiating Negotiations using competitive tactics (e.g., exaggerated initial positions, 
judicious disclosure of information, and much patience) but lacking dirty 
tricks and involving compromises so the other might feel like a winner and 
wish to negotiate again (Dawson, 1995)
Power Bargaining Negotiations using raw power, often aggressively, to intimidate the other, 
and various competitive tactics, including closed or control talk or dirty 
tricks, to try to claim greater value
Dirty Tricks Competitive tactics such as duplicity, distortion, personal attacks, emotional 
ploys, or lock-in tactics
Sources: Alex Kondra; Fisher (2006); Fisher and Ury (1980); George Smith
Embedded in Figure 1, the three-pronged formula involves: (1) 
 demonstrating that a major problem or performance gap exists or is 
 emerging, (2) playing on worst fears via the threat or use of forcing (Option 
Y), including the sanction (Plan B), and (3) providing incentives to foster 
change (Option X) or offers to settle (Plan A) (Fisher and Kondra, 1993).
Sanctions as Investments
Figure 3 shows the implicit concession paths and expected contractual 
formulae of Plan A versus B. It depicts the SAID approach inducing a settle-
ment lower than what might have been achieved without one. Like a weather 
forecast, each plan or scenario reflects a decision maker’s  perceptions and 
expectations, and negotiations may or may not unfold in this manner. Each 
will change when key constraints change or periodically as information is 
exchanged at the table.
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Plan A customarily leads to final offers, often just prior to the sanction 
deadline. In the endgame the SAID decision rule is to accept the other’s final 
offer (Plan A), if its certain benefits equal or exceed the expected benefits 
minus costs from invoking the sanction (Plan B) and vice versa. Decision 
makers will estimate the subjective probabilities associated with each plan 
and multiply them by the corresponding benefits or costs, appropriately 
capitalized, and sum these to determine expected benefits and expected 
sanction costs (Walton and McKersie, 1965).
Sanctions in Plan B include work stoppages and adjudicative  sanctions 
of Option Z in Figure 1 like arbitration or court actions. Although 
 comparators and key indicators may point towards possible resolutions, the 
outcome of a work stoppage can be very difficult to predict. As with other 
sanctions, its uncertainty and costs translate into psychological pressures 
that can unfreeze frozen mindsets, enabling the parties to settle. True grit 
(i.e., mental fortitude and resolve) tends to prevail, and a loss of unity can 
result in less favorable terms of settlement.
FIGURE 3
Plan A versus Plan B: 
A Decision Maker’s Implicit Concession Paths and Expected Contractual 
Formula Costing in Representative, Positional Bargaining by Committees
   
   
Time
Compensation package 
Commencement of negotiation Strike deadline or arbitration invocation 
Union’s possible offers 
Organization’s possible offers 
Plan A: Settle without a sanction 
Plan B: Settle via 
sanction, if possible 
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Avoiding Failure
Carefully managing the entire, complex, multi-directional,  representative 
negotiations’ process is crucial to avoid losing unity (Colosi, 1999). Option 
Z’s regulating mechanisms can assist to avoid the three main ways not 
to reach a settlement when one is feasible. They involve: (1) the closed 
mindedness of “tunnel vision,” (2) a clash of chief negotiators’ egos, and 
(3) incompetence or inexperience. Periodically rechecking assumptions 
should reduce fixation or rigidity. Just as a personality conflict should not 
preclude solving joint problems, the process should not be short circuited 
by incompetence or inexperience (Loughran, 2003).
Carefully Managing the Entire Process. Enunciated by a professional 
managerial negotiator, Table 1 suggests guidelines to avoid losing unity. 
It focuses on the competing visions of the future reflected in Figure 1’s 
forcing (Option Y), and uses the three-pronged formula to generate support 
for management’s initiative (Option X).
Solid preparations are crucial. They include being fully prepared to use 
the sanction (Option Y/Plan B) and estimating the other’s Plans A and B of 
Figure 3 to deduce an offer the other might ratify without a sanction. This 
implicit estimate of the other’s walk-away point then serves, in working 
backwards, to construct the probable concession paths in the given party’s 
Plan A and Plan B (Figure 3).
Aside from such backwards induction, also critical is developing 
and highlighting the good business reasons that support the mandate or 
proposed formula for the contract language (in Plan A). They must be 
 communicated effectively. Stressing comparators can increase persuasive 
capacity. Maintaining unity requires establishing and maintaining commit-
ment to the mandate that emerges—especially by key players—to form a 
consensus and sustain a stable coalition.
Option Z’s Regulating Mechanisms. Option Z represents a governor 
available to attempt to overcome obstacles to a peaceful settlement or to 
attempt to keep industrial conflict within society’s bounds of reasonable or 
acceptable collective behaviour or interaction.
Relying chiefly on the key tool of persuasion to change mindsets, 
Choice Z’s process interventions (e.g., mediation, fact finding, or private 
chief negotiators’ sessions) attempt to change negotiations dynamics to 
foster a settlement but leave the ultimate decision to the parties. Within 
process circumvention, the adjudicative sanctions of rights-based feed-
back mechanisms and back to work legislation impose decisions. Higher 
 authorities may grant rights not attainable through bargaining.
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TABLE 1
Key Elements of a Completely Managed Negotiation System
Element Description or Explanation
 1. Competitive Contest For the hearts and minds over:
Which vision of future should prevail?
 2. Consensus Build and sustain a solid coalition
 3. Commitment to Mandate To maintain a united front
 4. Contingency Plan Structure the situation: Option X versus 
Option Y
To play on the others’ worst fears
 5. Credible Threat Not a bluff: Option Y (the sanction) serves 
as a safety net
 6. Comparators Stressed Use external standards to promote legitimacy
 7. Compliance of Other
Forced via Option X 
versus Y
(Optional)
Own final offer from the outset of 
negotiations:
Formula for Option X designed to gain 
other’s approval
(The first credible offer on the table usually 
wins the day) 
 8. Control Agenda
(Optional)
To claim value
(To induce the other side to settle on your 
terms)
 9. Communicate 
Effectively
Convey message in a way the other side 
will understand, especially by giving good 
business reasons,
To change mindsets (e.g., lower their 
expectations)
10. Conduct Yourself 
Professionally
Maintain high standards:
Do not jump at other side’s bait or fall into 
their traps
Source: Chomyn (1998).
Permitting litigious forcing, adjudicative sanctions’ inherent delays mean 
they essentially serve as safety nets or backups to Options X or Y. The awards 
of courts or administrative tribunals normally respectively either enforce 
management’s envisaged restructuring or reinforce the union’s desired out-
come, typically the status quo (Ury, Brett and Goldenberg, 1988).
Not Short Circuit the Process. Negotiators essentially search for an 
elusive formula that will satisfy both sides’ needs or, at a minimum, be 
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ratified. After reaching an agreement in principle, deliberate negotiations 
should follow to ensure that intentions are properly reflected and one side 
does put something over on the other (Zartman and Berman, 1982).
PRO SPORTS’ FOUR MAJOR SHOWDOWNS 
AND TURNAROUNDS
The crucial battle line in collective bargaining has concerned the 
owner-player split of revenues. Players’ salaries occasionally have risen 
dramatically via bidding wars with rival leagues. Absent a rival league, 
salary spirals via collective bargaining have been attributed to factors such 
as free agency, agents, individual salary disclosure and arbitration, revenue 
growth, and the highly competitive urges of certain maverick owners (e.g., 
Staudohar, 1996: 42). Figure 4 shows the growth of salaries in professional 
sports.
To curb salary escalation, owners sought various restraint mechanisms 
via collective bargaining. They are intended to reduce the incentives for 
owners, especially free spending ones, to sign free agents so their teams can 
earn the extra moneys or recognition associated with making the postseason 
playoffs and especially winning a championship.
Applying to all teams, a salary cap limits the payroll for each team or 
group (e.g., first-year players). Penalties apply for exceeding this payroll 
limit. A “hard” salary cap may combine with a floor of minimum salaries to 
constrain the amount of funds available for free agent signings. “Linkage” 
limits players to a certain percentage of revenues, as defined contractu-
ally. The customary revenue split is in the range of fifty-four to sixty-four 
 percent. A “soft” salary cap has exceptions. The weakest payroll tax system 
levies a “luxury tax” against high-spending clubs. The league often  collects 
payroll taxes and redistributes them to smaller market clubs to foster a 
“level playing field” (Barnes, 1996).
Attempts to establish or revise salary cap rules precipitated each pro 
sport’s major showdowns (Table 2). To fully distil key elements of a major 
turnaround, I also examine baseball’s 2002 bargaining round, settled peace-
fully for the first time in nine rounds (below) (Yin, 1984).
Football: 1987–93 Nonunion Conversion
Football owners traditionally were the most strident and successful 
in resisting unionization. A very brief 1970 training camp strike yielded 
football’s first collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Following a 1974 
training camp strike that was aborted after fourteen days, owners operated 
for two and one-half years without a collective bargaining agreement. The 
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football union was nearly bankrupt from antitrust litigation, an Option Z 
adjudicative sanction (Figure 1). This clearly made settling with no sanction 
(Plan A) look progressively more attractive than continued litigation (Plan 
B). Hence, players eventually abandoned antitrust litigation (Option Z or 
Plan B) to gain the ensuing CBA (Plan A).
Varying Degrees of Forcing. Such hardball tactics and low 
 interdependence meant the parties tended to function to the left in Figure 2. 
Key factors rendering players vulnerable to owners’ divide and conquer 
tactics include football’s comparatively few games, many players, a large 
pool of possible replacements, and very short and risky careers (Edge, 
2004). After several failed or only very partially successful strikes during 
the 1960s and 1970s, the parties, nevertheless, exhibited cordial relations 
(Staudohar, 1988).
Salary Spiral and Replacement Football in 1987. Salaries had doubled 
between the end of a fifty-seven day strike in 1982, which yielded very 
TABLE 2
Games Lost in Key Professional Sports’ Lawful Work Stoppages
Years Disruption Days Games Lost Championship Lost
2004–5 NHL Lockout 301 Entire Season Stanley Cup
1998–9 NBA Lockout 191 464
1994–5 MLB Strike 232 921 World Series
1994–5 NHL Lockout 103 468
1992 NHL Strike  10 (30)
1987 NFL Strike  25 14 [Nonunion 
Conversion]
1982 NFL Strike  57 98
1981 MLB Strike  50 712
Legend:
NHL National Hockey League
NBA National Basketball Association
MLB Major League Baseball
( ) Playoff games lost were rescheduled, extending the playoffs
NFL National Football League
[ ] The union was broken, ordered players to return to work, filed an antitrust 
suit, and later decertified to render owners vulnerable to antitrust litigation; 
this induced a settlement in 1993 after the union won the civil suit
Sources: Barnes (1996); CBC Sports Online (2005); Edmonton Journal (2004).
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little for players, and 1987. This salary spiral had been primarily due to a 
rival league, which collapsed prior to the 1987 round, creating a pool of 
possible replacements. After feeble negotiations, players entered the 1987 
strike without a strike fund. They, therefore, incurred considerable sanction 
costs in exercising Plan B. For this and other reasons, many players crossed 
picket lines to return to play (Table 2).
Plan Z: Litigious Resistance. After ordering players to return without 
a contract, their association filed an antitrust suit and later decertified. 
The latter nonunion conversion (Option Y) rendered owners vulnerable to 
 antitrust litigation via rights-based feedback loops (Option Z). Such  litigious 
resistance thereby managed both sides’ Plan Bs to favour the union, and 
it worked.
Three-Pronged Formula: Hard Salary Cap. Owners lost the civil 
suit over their 1989 “Plan B” free agency rules in mid-1992. In the SAID 
approach, fears of more litigation (Plan Z) under antitrust law (Plan B) 
induced owners to agree in 1993 to a CBA (Plan A). The resulting hard 
salary cap (owners’ Option X) reflected the good deal of leverage football 
owners traditionally enjoyed (Staudohar, 1988, 1996).
Post Mortem. Football’s dramatic events seem to suggest the 
 following:
 • Proposition 1. The parties will use the strategic choice Options X versus 
Y in Figure 1 and sanction as an investment device’s Plan A versus B 
in Figure 2 to engineer or manage their responses to a major change 
initiative.
 • Proposition 2. In a work stoppage the parties will use a forcing strategy 
(Option Y) and SAID carrot and stick bargaining style (Plan A versus 
B) to try to impose their terms (Figures 1–2).
 • Proposition 3. In applying the SAID approach, the sides will judiciously 
time, provoke, or escalate sanctions to attempt to impose their terms 
(Option Y).
 • Proposition 4. The parties or factions (below) will attempt to use 
litigious and other maneuvers (Option Z) to manage Plan B walk-away 
points to their advantage.
Basketball: 1998–9 Lockout
Facing a major problem, namely possible financial disaster (Option 
Y/Plan B), basketball in 1983 was the first pro sport to implement a salary 
cap (Option X), and it did so without a sanction (Plan A). This fostering 
change and major reconfiguration or turnaround (Figure 1) clearly meant 
the parties tended to function on the right-hand side of Figure 2. Consistent 
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with Proposition 4 the players’ association continued to pursue or threaten 
litigious maneuvers (Option Z). Indeed, to avoid a threatened union decer-
tification and antitrust litigation (the union’s Options Y and Z or Plan B), 
basketball owners signed the richest settlement in pro sports in 1987 (the 
union’s Plan A). This union forcing success, accomplished by merely 
threatening adjudicative sanctions, generated a performance gap by the mid-
1990s, as did certain “exceptions” that had created a soft salary cap (Figure 
1). Management once again sought to engineer a turnaround, but escalated 
to a forcing strategy (Option Y/Plan B) consistent with Propositions 1–3.
Lockouts and Factional (Litigious) Resistance. Two preemptive,  off-
season lockouts in 1995 and 1996 ended the longest standing labour peace 
in pro sports. During the basketball lockout in the summer of 1995, a group 
of star players and their agents, consistent with Proposition 4, tried to 
torpedo the settlement by having the union decertified (Option Y/Plan B). 
This forced a vote between decertification and ratifying the memorandum 
of agreement to lift the lockout (Plan A). The agreement was ratified. This 
attempted “hijacking” of negotiations by agents acting as de-stabilizers 
created a lingering internal rift and contributed to the union head being 
replaced. It also tended to blunt managerial change initiatives, postponing 
the day or reckoning. Owners once again pursued a major reconfiguration 
while escalating the sanction consistent with Propositions 1–3.
Forcing (Option Y) to Gain a Major Turnaround (Option X). To control 
and further decrease players’ slice of revenues, basketball owners sought 
to close certain loopholes of the soft salary cap and limit rookies’ salaries 
(Option X). As learned from hockey’s prolonged lockout from the outset 
of the 1994 season (Option Y/Plan B), basketball successfully sacrificed 
much of the regular season in 1998–9 to increase its revenue split and gain 
certain concessions (Table 2). The resulting salary scale (Option X/Plan A) 
was the very first in professional sports (Staudohar, 1999). This and other 
salary restraint measures briefly restrained average salaries (Figure 4).
Stable Formulae. Both basketball and football owners successfully 
applied the SAID approach to gain salary caps and other salary restraints. 
Thus, these sanctions apparently paid off. Each CBA was renewed since 
without a sanction. The underlying formulae seem to promote stability.
Post Mortem. Basketball’s turnaround appears to yield:
 • Proposition 5. A successful major reconfiguration will greatly lower 
the probability of a subsequent work stoppage.
 • Proposition 6. One side will seek to find and exploit loopholes in the 
reconfigured contractual formula; the other will respond by seeking 
corrective actions during renegotiations.
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Proposition 6 notably involves a dialectical process of thesis (the 
reconfigured wording), antithesis (the loophole), and then synthesis (the 
corrected language).
Baseball: 1994–95 Strike
Professional baseball had the first comprehensive CBA. As a pioneer, 
it had a series of negotiations where critical precedents—especially those 
surrounding free agency and the split of industry revenues—were being set 
or reset and divide and conquer strategies pursued. Players out- negotiated 
owners early on, gaining free agency after six years of play in 1976, and 
spent the next several rounds defending such gains. Baseball owners 
 notoriously gave away bargaining power by breaking ranks. Interventions by 
three  commissioners tended to blunt owners’ change initiatives,  increasing 
players’ leverage. Owners rectified this problem in the early 1990s by 
appointing one of their own, instead of an outsider, as commissioner.
Following a series of seven consecutive work stoppages, including an 
abortive lockout in 1990, owners were looking to finally gain a salary cap. 
Baseball’s 1994–5 strike was the longest in sports’ history (Table 2).
Thumbnail Sketch. This prolonged, complex, and convoluted dispute 
essentially ended in a lose/lose draw. Owners developed a flawed forcing 
strategy that was poorly executed, lacked a sustained consensus on strat-
egy and key issues, and made fallacious assumptions about labour law. 
Both sides lost considerable sums of money in the medium term. Aided 
by  litigious forcing and especially court supervised negotiations, they 
 eventually came up with a formula that was adjusted in the 2002 bargaining 
round without a sanction.
Transition Point and Change Initiative. Having over committed on 
salaries, a severe drop in television revenues exacerbated owners’ concerns 
that they lacked significant “drags” on salaries. They hired a new chief 
negotiator to implement a 1990-like major change initiative: (1) a salary cap 
and (2) owners’ revenue sharing in exchange for (3) a stipulated  splitting 
of revenues with players. Revenue sharing meant local television and 
other revenues would flow from big to smaller market teams to promote a 
“competitive balance” among clubs and, perhaps, higher salaries at smaller 
market teams (Fisher, 2006).
Flawed Forcing and Downward Spiral (Plan Y). In a clear-cut  forcing 
strategy (owners’ Plan Y), certain key details were not tabled until  eighteen 
months after negotiations began. Some were unpalatable to players. Owners 
proposed, for instance, eliminating salary arbitration in exchange for 
 lowering free agency access from six to four years. There was “no way” 
players would agree, partly because it “was so late in coming and put forth 
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such radical changes” (Staudohar, 1996: 50). Loathing such salary restraints 
and having a sizeable strike fund, players struck in August.
Already in the (lower left-hand) forcing quadrant of Figure 2, such 
extreme mutual hardball predictably caused relations to further deteriorate, 
especially between the two chief negotiators (Figure 1). Reflecting the 
constructive potential of Option Z, mediators suggested a critical process 
intervention: that a group of owners replace their hired gun.
Owners’ Lack or Loss of Consensus. Owners’ disunity was evident. 
Initially they took over one year to agree on a revenue sharing scheme. 
Near the end, they broke ranks on using replacement players and probably 
lacked the three-quarters majority vote for a lockout. That rule had been 
adopted just prior to this round to promote owners’ unity (Staudohar, 1996, 
1997).
Impasse and Litigious Forcing. Declaring an impasse in late 1994, 
owners unilaterally eliminated salary arbitration and the previous open 
market for free agent players and imposed a salary cap (Option Y/Plan B). 
They mistakenly assumed the first two items were not mandatory subjects 
of  collective bargaining. The union filed several bad faith  bargaining 
complaints. This led to owners’ removing the salary cap from the  bargaining 
table and the issuance of an injunction in the spring of 1995 (Pappas, 2002). 
By reinstating the expired CBA, the injunction created a face-saving end to 
the strike. Imposing the union’s vision, the status quo, kept the  parties on the 
downward spiral of Option Y in Figure 1, though under court  supervision 
(Option Z).
Bargaining Failure. This bargaining failure exhibited all three  classic 
elements: (1) a fixation on each side’s own bargaining agenda to the 
 exclusion of exploring possible common ground, (2) a personality clash 
among chief negotiators, and (3) apparent bungling, reflecting incompetence 
or inexperience. Owners’ difficulties in sustaining a consensus undoubtedly 
exacerbated the corresponding negotiations’ paralysis.
Court Supervised Negotiations. A CBA formula satisfying both sides’ 
needs gradually emerged under court supervision. Involving a luxury tax 
and revenue sharing and spreading this major reconfiguration over several 
years, the settlement of late 1996 formed the basis for the peaceful settle-
ments of 2002 and 2006 (below) (Fisher 2006).
Post Mortem. Loughran corroborates several propositions derived from 
this protracted, convoluted dispute (2003):
 • Proposition 7. Tunnel vision, a personality conflict between chief 
negotiators, or inexperience or incompetence will distort or deflect 
negotiators’ focus on exploring possible common ground. This will cause 
unnecessary sanctions, should Plan B walk-away points overlap.
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 • Proposition 8. The side that loses unity first will lose leverage, thereby 
settling on terms less favourable than its original bargaining agenda or 
mandate.
 • Proposition 9. Not introducing radical changes early on in negotiations 
will blunt, if not curtail, their full implementation.
 • Proposition 10. Court supervised negotiations will provide a stabilizing 
contractual formula for future bargaining rounds.
Baseball: 2002 Peaceful Settlement
This round featured process interventions to further an ongoing shift 
towards power negotiating (Figure 2), baseball’s use of the three-pronged 
formula, its carefully and well orchestrating the entire process, and the 
SAID approach. The substantial costs of disagreement, a “tweakable” CBA 
formula, and the emergence of a common enemy likewise were key factors 
promoting settling without a sanction.
Process Interventions (Option Z). To carefully “conduct” this high 
profile round, baseball had a new, hand-picked chief negotiator. Both 
sides’ heads turned negotiations over to trusted aids to maintain room to 
maneuver and their political stock (Major League Baseball or MLB, 2002). 
A second room was instituted so the parties’ representatives could, without 
authority, seek solutions to problems and develop supporting rationales 
(Reuben, 1995). This clearly indicates a shift upwards in Figure 2 at least 
for negotiators.
Three-Pronged Formula. The 2002 round tended to be orchestrated 
consistent with the three-pronged formula and Table 1 (Pappas, 2002: 3):
The owners, led by Bud Selig, prepared for the 2001–02 negotiations with 
unusual foresight. Instead of talking about the need to cut player salaries, 
the owners spoke in terms of “improving competitive balance.” The 
commissioner’s hand-selected “blue ribbon economic panel” recommended 
greater revenue sharing and a higher luxury tax in a report released with great 
fanfare by MLB. Except for the aborted attempt to contract by two teams, 
most of the owners’ opening offer in the 2002 labor talks was taken directly 
from the blue ribbon panel.
Thus, the blue ribbon panel helped reveal a performance gap, 
 established an initial vision for restructuring (Option X), and legitimized 
MLB’s  opening offers (Plan A in Figure 3). Consistent with Table 1, MLB 
placed a gag order on owners and set hefty fines for speaking out of turn to 
maintain unity, kept their consensus, and won the public relations battle.
Structuring the Situation to Play on Worst Fears. Owners pledged not 
to lock out players during the regular season. This forced the union to set a 
strike deadline during the regular season to avoid its worst fear: a lockout 
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by owners and possible eventual unilateral imposition of an owner Plan B 
nonunion contract (Option Y), as had transpired in 1994–5. Set for the end 
of August, the strike deadline brought closure. Negotiations progressed 
professionally, ending in an eleventh hour settlement (Staudohar, 2002).
SAID Approach. Union negotiator and player B. J. Surhoff clearly 
viewed the sanction as an investment device (Czerwinski, 2002: 1, emphasis 
added): “Both sides were posed with the same question each time. At what 
point is it in our best interest to make a deal or at what point is it in our 
best interest to walk away?”
Prohibitive Costs of Disagreement (for Option Y/Plan B). The costs 
of disagreement were prohibitive for both sides. The 1994–5 strike had 
 substantially eroded baseball’s fan base, which took several years to 
regenerate. Huge television fees and reputations were at stake (MLB, 
2002; Staudohar, 2002). Players were victims of their own success: average 
 salaries of $2.3 million. Their Achilles heel was their short careers. Viewed 
as being greedy or inclined to “kill the goose that laid the golden egg,” they 
also lacked fan support for a strike (Pappas, 2002).
Managing the Entire Process: The Common Enemy. The New York 
Yankees won four of five World Series in 1996–2000, lost in 2001, and 
were by far the highest spending team. Consistent with having good business 
reasons in Table 1, the principals on both sides tended to coalesce around 
them as the common enemy in support of luxury tax increases. The Yankees 
were the only team to vote against the ensuing settlement.
Formula Tweaked. In the battle of billionaire owners versus millionaire 
players, the pendulum had swung in favour of owners, resulting in a series 
of concessions by players. The 1996 formula was adjusted to increase the 
bite of the luxury tax and revenue sharing.
Turnaround Overview. A CBA formula had emerged by late 1996 
that could be adjusted to satisfy various factions and foster ratification. 
Confronted with prohibitive costs of disagreement, the parties learned to 
adhere to Table 1’s “Magical Cs.” Their 2002 deal appeared to be fair to 
both under the circumstances (Czerwinski, 2002; Staudohar, 2002). Its basic 
formula was peacefully renewed with minor modifications for five years in 
2006 (De Jesus Ortiz, 2006).
Post Mortem. These peaceful renegotiations suggest:
 • Proposition 11. Should the parties desire to settle without a sanction, 
they will use or develop forms of process intervention to foster that 
result.
 • Proposition 12. The change initiator/advocate will use the  three-pronged 
formula (above) to try to engineer a major turnaround.
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 • Proposition 13. High costs of disagreement for both sides will increase 
the probability of agreeing to a major reconfiguration without a 
sanction.
 • Proposition 14. Managing the entire process consistent with Table 1 
has a very high probability of generating the desired reconfiguration.
Hockey: 2004–5 Lockout and Loss of a Season
Hockey’s early relationship was characterized by collusion. Hence, its 
free agency provisions tended to lag behind their comparators.
The corrupt union head’s successor, nicknamed “Eleventh Hour,” 
orchestrated hockey’s first strike during the 1992 playoffs, partly to show 
his mettle (Table 2). The National Hockey League (NHL) then hired a new 
commissioner: the architect of basketball’s salary cap. Seeking a salary 
cap (Plan X), the NHL “spent” most of the 1994–5 season in a lockout 
(Table 2).
Transition Point. Hastily drafted, the 1995 CBA’s flaws soon emerged 
consistent with Proposition 6. The breakthrough rookie salary cap failed to 
limit signing or performance bonuses for first-year players. In strategically 
negotiating players’ salaries, the union and agents skillfully used a limited 
talent pool of free agents and the exclusive contractual right to invoke (“one-
way”) arbitration to ignite and fuel a dramatic salary escalation (Figure 4). 
Bidding wars for top players lifted salaries. Only the most favorable cases 
went to salary arbitration. Voted in by players in 1989, salary disclosure 
made salary arbitration work.
The ensuing salary spiral led to a major showdown in 2004 (Dowbiggin, 
2003; Edge, 2004). The NHL used the three-pronged formula and SAID 
approach while carefully managing the entire process. Though  paralleling the 
way baseball structured the situation in 2002, hockey’s 2004  renegotiation 
led to a lockout that cost the entire season (Table 2). This reflected union 
intransigence and the large size of hockey’s performance gap relative to 
the rest of the industry (Dowbiggin, 2003).
Three-Pronged Formula. Similar to baseball’s 2002 blue ribbon panel, 
the NHL hired an accountant to assess the performance gap. At seventy-
five percent he found NHL players’ split of revenues greatly exceeded their 
counterparts’ split in 2004. Average salaries were $1.79 million. Nineteen 
of thirty hockey clubs lost money in 2002–3 with average team losses of 
$9.9 million. Players disputed these figures but refused until late in the 
dispute to jointly verify them (CBC Sports Online, 2005). Like basketball 
in 1998–9 owners locked players out to play on their worst fears and built 
a consensus around their change initiative (Option X) whose contractual 
formula (Plan A) provided incentives to change (below).
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SAID Approach. The NHL’s reconfiguring was predicated on “cost 
certainty:” a salary cap and players’ cut of revenues at fifty-four percent. 
The players’ association adamantly stated it would never agree. As  walk-
away points did not overlap, this signified a legitimate use of the sanction 
to change mindsets. The lockout was imposed prior to training camp in 
2004.
Managing the Entire Process. Hockey, like baseball in 2002, placed a 
gag order on owners. It was later lifted when propitious to do so. The NHL 
also taxed its thirty clubs ten million dollars each to build a defence line 
of credit. These measures clearly were to ensure that owners’ consensus 
around the envisaged restructuring or mandate (Plan A) would not break 
down pursuant to Table 1, and it did not. As in baseball, the Commissioner’s 
right-hand man served as the NHL’s chief negotiator to politically buffer 
him.
The NHL’s envisaged reconfiguration included a partnership between 
players and owners. Its incentives to change included inviting player 
 representatives to participate in determining rule changes to the game, 
 previously an exclusive managerial right. To win back fans, the on-ice 
product was modified chiefly to generate more offence and eliminate tied 
games.
The 1995 memorandum of agreement was concluded at the brink of 
losing the season. Drafted later, the full agreement reflected the rapidity
of its executed. Enjoying considerable leverage in 2005, the NHL refused 
to ratify an agreement until it was fully drafted and vetted by NHL lawyers 
and others. This clearly intended to ensure that the 2005 CBA formula 
reflected the NHL’s reconfiguration intentions.
Final Formula: Worst Fears (Option Y/Plan B) and Stability. The final 
CBA formula contained a lower payroll cap than the NHL’s last offer and 
a union-proposed salary cut of twenty-four percent across the board. Much 
to the surprise or chagrin of many players, the union reversed its position 
of “no salary cap” just prior to the “drop dead” date for the season in mid-
February of 2005. Cancelling the season greatly cut into the  average career 
earning span of five and one-half years. Many players played in Europe to 
mitigate sanction costs.
Later when facing the nightmarish Plan B of losing another season, 
players’ consensus collapsed. Consistent with Proposition 8 and, perhaps, 7, 
they accepted the lower salary cap and a fifty-four percent linkage of salaries 
to revenues for a broader definition of revenues. Following basketball’s 
1999 example, players’ salaries were taxed and placed in escrow to ensure 
this split. A key incentive reinforced the parties’ new partnership: should 
revenues grow, so would the players’ slice by increasing the salary cap. 
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Two major gains by players were an annual phased in lowering of eligibility 
for free agency and minimum salary increases (CBC Sports Online, 2005; 
Edmonton Journal, 2005b; Staudohar, 2005).
Initial indications are that the 2005 NHL contractual formula will 
 promote industrial peace. The former, rather intransigent head of the union 
was replaced by the more pragmatic second in command who negotiated the 
current agreement. The new “My NHL” seemed to be a hit with  customers 
in the fall of 2005. Positive results included greater goal scoring, new 
attendance records, and increased television ratings for hockey broadcasts 
compared with the fall of 2003 (Edmonton Journal, 2005a). The salary 
cap was raised in 2006, and escrow payments plus an adjustment were 
returned to players.
Recap and Prognosis. The NHL learned to build and retain a consensus 
around a mandate consistent with Table 1. As in baseball in 2002,  hockey’s 
transforming negotiations from previous power bargaining to power 
 negotiating in 2005 seems to have improved the parties’ relationship (an 
upwards shift in Figure 2). Despite the salary cut, both sides stand to lose 
a lot in a sanction. The CBA formula could well be adjusted peacefully in 
future bargaining rounds.
Post Mortem. Hockey’s major showdown adds the following about not 
short circuiting the process and periodically rechecking assumptions:
 • Proposition 15. Patience and due diligence in negotiating and particularly 
drafting an agreement will have a high probability of avoiding adverse 
unforeseen consequences.
 • Proposition 16. Giving one side unilateral control over access to an 
adjudicative sanction (Option Z/Plan B) allows it to strategically 
position potential cases in their portfolio of negotiations. This 
specifically permits it to only let the most favorable cases go forward, 
increasing its relative bargaining power.
 • Proposition 17. Underestimating (or overestimating) the other side, 
especially their capability to withstand the pressures of a sanction, 
will erode bargaining power, resulting in less advantageous terms of 
settlement.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The limited experiences studied suggest work stoppages—if properly 
managed, especially to avoid breaking ranks—can pay off for  management 
by inducing union concessions. Such sanctions fostered turnarounds 
closely resembling management’s initial vision in three of the four major 
 showdowns: football in 1987–93, basketball in 1998–9, and hockey in 
2004–5. With the aid of court supervision, baseball’s lengthy strike of 
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1994–5, clearly a medium term lose/lose event, also produced a contractual 
formula promoting industrial peace (Proposition 10). That is, in searching 
for that elusive formula that satisfies both sides’ needs, the parties  apparently 
found it in the cases studied.
Both hockey’s 2004–5 major showdown and baseball’s peaceful 2002 
round were orchestrated consistent with the main guidelines for  engineering 
a turnaround: Propositions 1–6 and 11–15. Reflecting the broad range of 
phenomena studied, the remaining propositions suggest important ways to 
avoid negotiation failure.
My framework and propositions should apply to other longstanding 
(contractual) relationships. The SAID approach’s Plan B emphasizes the 
fundamental power to resist or walk away. The three-pronged formula 
incorporates the carrot and stick strategic choices of fostering (Option X) 
versus forcing (Option Y) and their strategic negotiation counterparts: settle 
without a sanction (Plan A) versus invoke one (Plan B). Option Z’s litigious 
and other maneuvers contribute an important set of regulating mechanisms 
to engineer a major turnaround, as reflected in Propositions 4, 10, and 11. 
They notably include the backups of (litigious) forcing via rights-based 
feedback loops or otherwise engaging higher authorities to try to induce 
a sanction-ending decision or constructively redirect negotiations, which 
process interventions also foster. All are strategic options we consider and 
exercise in our daily lives, including in individual decision making (i.e., 
negotiating with ourselves) and negotiating with others.
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RÉSUMÉ
Les grèves profitent-elles à la direction ? Des tournants majeurs 
dans le sport professionnel
La négociation collective et la législation antitrust ont libéré les joueurs 
d’une espèce de servitude à long terme. L’arrivée des agents libres et des 
dispositions contractuelles qui s’y rapportent ont créé une bataille en règle 
sur le partage des revenus. Les arrêts de travail peuvent mousser la résistance 
des joueurs ou renforcer chez les employeurs les mécanismes de contraintes 
salariales. Chaque sport majeur a connu une épreuve de force qui a mené 
à une « négociation de survie ».
Le graphique 1 présenté dans l’article s’appuie sur le modèle 
 évolutif du choix stratégique de Chaykowski et Verma (1992), tout en lui 
 apportant un complément. Selon ce modèle, un changement important dans 
l’environnement déclenche un « écart de performance » et créé ainsi un 
« point de transition ». Tout en intégrant la vision de l’avenir de la  direction, 
son initiative de changement de type « signe de détresse » déclenche d’une 
manière singulière une lutte pour s’emparer des esprits et des cœurs des 
membres de l’unité de négociation : ceux qui vont voter pour un règlement 
proposé ou pour une éventuelle sanction.
La reconfiguration proposée par la direction ou l’Option X incorpore un 
arrangement contractuel qui se veut ou qui se propose d’être à l’avantage 
des deux côtés dans les circonstances. L’ordre du jour de négociation du 
syndicat qui se propose de résister et de maintenir le statu quo entraîne 
une descente en spirale de l’Option Y. La stratégie hybride de la direction 
d’introduire de force l’Option X comprend aussi la réduction du pouvoir 
de négociation du Plan Y et, possiblement, le recours à une sanction. Dans 
une négociation de survie, cela entraîne un choix stratégique entre « gravir 
l’escalier abrupte de l’Option X » ou bien de « suivre la pente glissante 
de l’Option Y », incluant la possibilité d’aller jusqu’à la disparition du 
syndicat.
Étant donné la nature conflictuelle des Options X et Y, la direction se 
sert normalement d’une formule comprenant trois volets, espérant changer 
l’attitude de son opposé en cherchant à réaliser l’Option X. Premièrement, 
démontrer l’existence d’un problème majeur; deuxièmement, jouer la carte 
des pires craintes (celles de l’Option Y); troisièmement, offrir ou fournir des 
incitatifs pour régler maintenant (Option X). Cette double stratégie de jouer 
sur les deux Options X et Y est clairement une politique de la carotte et du 
bâton. La formule à trois volets comprend également la sanction  (imposition 
d’un règlement par la loi ou par voie de décision arbitrale) comme un 
mécanisme d’implication (Sanction Comme Mécanisme d’Implication) 
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(SCMI) : le Plan A versus le Plan B. Dans la terminologie SCMI, le Plan 
A représente un règlement sans sanction, alors que le Plan B implique un 
règlement en cours de sanction.
La formule à trois volets apparaît permettre un repositionnement 
 stratégique après l’atteinte du point de transition. L’approche SCMI vient à 
l’encontre du mythe que les grèves ne paient pas. L’expérience plutôt limitée 
examinée ici laisse croire que les arrêts de travail peuvent être profitables 
à la direction en amenant des concessions du syndicat. Les sanctions ont 
provoqué des tournants qui ressemblaient fortement à la vision initiale de la 
direction dans trois des quatre épreuves de force étudiées : celle du football 
en 1987–1993, le basketball en 1998-1999 et le hockey en 2004-2005. La 
longue grève du baseball des années 1994-1995, qui fut certainement un 
événement de perdant-perdant à moyen terme, a officiellement donné lieu 
à un aménagement contractuel qui favorise l’avenir de l’industrie. Depuis, 
les parties ont apparemment trouvé la formule floue qui satisfasse leurs 
besoins.
À titre de renforts aux Options X et Y, l’option Z implique des 
mécanismes de retour reconnus par des droits, dont les décisions  viennent 
préciser les intérêts et le pouvoir des deux parties et renforcer leur vision 
respective de l’avenir. La législation sur le retour au travail impose 
 également une décision, qui en bout de ligne confère des droits impossibles 
à atteindre par voie de négociation. En laissant aux parties la décision finale, 
le processus d’intervention repose avant tout sur la persuasion dans le but 
de changer les états d’esprit.
Le cadre de référence élaboré dans cette étude englobe un éventail 
assez large d’événements et contribue à leur donner une signification. 
Les  décisions des cours et des tribunaux administratifs ont joué un rôle 
crucial dans la poursuite de règlements au cours des épreuves de force 
dans le football et le baseball. Certaines interventions dans le processus à 
l’interne ont amené un glissement de paradigme de la recherche du pouvoir 
de marchandage pur et simple vers un pouvoir de négociation au cours des 
rondes de 2002 dans le baseball et du lock-out du hockey en 2004-2005. 
Le règlement législatif intervenu dans le baseball en 1997-1998 a contribué 
à améliorer les relations entre les parties.
Le cadre de référence modifie aussi l’approche SCMI de Walton et 
McKersie (1965) et lui donne plus d’ampleur en retenant « la  négociation 
intra organisationnelle » et la « structuration des attitudes ». Il établit un 
pont entre l’approche SCMI et le paradigme « HIVE » envisageant la 
 négociation représentative et multidirectionnelle, ce qui inclut la  négociation 
avec l’agent principal (intra organisationnel). Dans les négociations les plus 
rudes à l’intérieur des équipes, les chefs négociateurs adoptent le rôle de 
quasi médiateurs dans leur tentative d’obtenir un arrangement entre les des 
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éléments pondérateurs et non pondérateurs, c’est-à-dire les dissidents dans 
un comité de négociation.
L’agencement des deux approches « HIVE » et SCMI permet de 
saisir les ramifications importantes des politiques organisationnelles dans 
les négociations. Un exemple frappant est celui du braquage avorté des 
 négociations en 1995 dans le basketball par une poignée de joueurs étoiles et 
leurs agents, ce qui a entrainé l’instabilité politique interne et un  changement 
du leadership syndical. Le « C Magique » du tableau 1 présente une bonne 
vision de la manière dont les propriétaires ont maintenu l’unité dans les 
rondes de négociations dans le baseball en 2002 et dans le long conflit du 
hockey en 2004-2005.
En abordant la gestion des relations, le graphique 2 jette un  éclairage 
utile, plus précisément, lorsqu’on fait le pont avec le concept clé de 
 négociations de transformation en passant d’une lutte démoralisante pour 
le pouvoir à une négociation de pouvoir. Cette dernière négociation  permet 
de promouvoir des intérêts personnels, mais également de réaliser des 
 compromis de façon à gagner le respect, tout en bâtissant une  relation de 
confiance et en favorisant un engagement à l’endroit d’un accord. Tout 
comme dans le baseball en 2002, les négociations dans le hockey en 
2005, en introduisant les mêmes modifications, ont contribué à  améliorer 
les relations entre les parties (voir le glissement vers le haut dans le
graphique 2).
Le cadre de référence devrait s’appliquer à d’autres relations 
 contractuelles établies depuis longtemps dans les cas de renégociations 
périodiques. Le Plan B de l’approche SCMI accentue le pouvoir de résister 
ou de s’en aller. La formule à trois volets inclut la stratégie du bâton et 
de la carotte, la stratégie hybride (Plan A versus Plan B) et la contrepartie 
en termes de choix stratégique (Option X versus Option Y). Le Plan Z 
comprend les supports en termes de résistance ou de contrainte, en termes 
de recours en dernier ressort à une législation, qui inciterait l’autorité 
compétence ou un tribunal à mettre fin au conflit par voie de sanction. Il 
inclut aussi des interventions sur les processus de manière à réorienter les 
négociations. En effet, ce sont là des choix stratégiques que nous retenons 
et que nous exerçons dans nos vies quotidiennes, ce qui inclut une prise de 
décision individuelle (c’est-à-dire que nous négocions avec nous-mêmes) 
et une négociation avec d’autres.
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